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The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings   
Abstract: We investigate the influence of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power 
settings. Based on exchange theory, we expect that buyers with detailed cost information and less power than 
their opponent may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of 
our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when 
the buyer has detailed cost information and that this result can be explained by the buyer’s negotiation 
behavior.   
Key words: Cost Information, Power, Buyer-Supplier Relations, Negotiation   
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1. Introduction  
The  academic  accounting  literature  recurrently  depicts  Total  Cost  of  Ownership  (TCO)  analysis  as  an 
important and useful tool for negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Roodhooft, 
Hiel, Van den Abbeele & van Doveren, 2003; Roodhooft, Van den Abbeele & Peeters, 2005). The idea is 
that the refined cost and cost driver information resulting from a TCO analysis can be used to optimize and 
better coordinate the performance of activities across the supply chain. However, empirical evidence for the 
claim  has  yet  to  be  provided.  The  objective  of  this  study  is  therefore  to  assess  to  which  extent  TCO 
information can be useful in inter-firm cost management and resulting negotiations between buyers and 
suppliers.   
Previous  research  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  information  sharing  to  the  effectiveness  of  buyer–
supplier relationships (Bensaou, 1999). However, due to  the reluctance of people involved  to  share  the 
information necessary for inter-firm cost minimization, firms may not realize all gains from buyer-supplier 
negotiations. Research is therefore needed to untangle the interplay between the need to share information to 
optimize the activities across the supply chain and the reluctance to share private information. Drake and 
Haka  (2005)  show  that  concerns  about  inequity  can  motivate  a  failure  to  share  detailed  accounting 
information and result in less efficient negotiation outcomes between buyers and suppliers. However, other 
factors influencing the usefulness of more refined cost information in buyer-supplier negotiations need to be 
identified.   
One such important factor is the relative power of the negotiators. We investigate therefore the influence of 
TCO information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings. We focus on power for two 
specific reasons. First, the relative power structure is almost always critical in the development of bargaining 
strategies and in evaluating likely outcomes. Second, we expect that the usefulness of TCO information for 
inter-firm negotiations will depend on the relative power of buyer and supplier.    
Researching this topic is also important because purchasing professionals in many companies still need to 
demonstrate the contribution they make to their firm (Carr & Pearson, 1999). In addition, the supply side of 
companies has become increasingly important over the last few decades. Costs of purchased goods and  
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services  represent  the  majority  of  total  costs  for  most  companies  (Degraeve  &  Roodhooft,  2001).  It  is 
relevant for both powerful and less powerful purchasing firms to understand which negotiation approaches 
will contribute to market success and profitability (Janda & Seshardi, 2001).  
The  results  of  our  experiment  show  that  the  performance  disadvantage  of  less  powerful  buyers  is  less 
pronounced when the buyer has detailed cost information. Based on exchange theory, we expect that buyers 
with detailed cost information and less power than their opponent may try to (re)gain control over their own 
outcomes by sharing information and by creating an integrative bargaining situation. Detailed analyses of the 
bargaining  behavior  support  this  hypothesis:  we  find  that  bargaining  behavior  mediates  the  moderating 
effects of cost information on the power to individual profit relation.     
The next section reviews the relevant literature and develops hypotheses. The experimental procedures are 
outlined in section three and the results are analyzed in section four. Section five includes discussion and 
suggestions for future research.   
2. Literature review 
2.1 Exchange models for negotiation 
Economic models of negotiation assume rational action by all parties. If these economic models provided 
full accurate descriptions of negotiation outcomes, empirical research would be unnecessary: behavior could 
simply be deduced from theory. Recent research, however, indicates that negotiator behavior differs from the 
predictions  of  game-theoretic  models.  Building  on  behavioral  decision  making,  research  on  two-party 
negotiations suggests that negotiators tend to (i) ignore the cognitions of others, (ii) be overconfident, (iii) 
escalate  commitment,  (iv)  assume  that  outcomes  are  fixed-sum,  and  therefore  overestimate  the 
competitiveness of their negotiation, (v) overweight readily available information, and (vi) be highly affected 
by  the  way  their  negotiation  is  framed  (for  a  review  see  Bazerman,  Curhan,  Moore  &  Valley,  2000). 
Evidence shows that, despite the existence of an agreement zone, deviations from rationality in individual 
decisions lead to disagreements and Pareto-inefficient agreements. Raiffa (1982) has argued that rational 
models are insufficient for either understanding or prescription and that advice to negotiators should depend  
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on an understanding of the actual decision process of the opponent, rather than assuming that the other party 
is fully rational. Behavioral decision models and research offers a set of adjustments to rational models.   
Exchange  models  offer  some  perspective  here.  Exchange  models  generally  describe  bargaining  and 
negotiation  as  a  process  characterized  by  information  exchange,  joint-problem  solving  and  persuasion 
(Alexander,  Schul  &  McCorkle,  1994).  A  majority  of  research  on  industrial  negotiations  is  based  on 
theoretical perspectives drawn from both social exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Gergen, 1969; 
Druckman,  1977)  and  exchange  theory  (Homans,  1974;  Bagozzi,  1978).  In  this  framework,  negotiation 
outcomes (e.g. level of buyer and/or seller satisfaction, profits, whether or no agreement is reached) are seen 
as a complex interaction of three constructs: namely negotiator characteristics, situational characteristics, and 
the characteristics of the negotiation process itself (Campbell, Graham, Jolibert & Meissner, 1988). In this 
view,  negotiator  characteristics  and  situational  characteristics  are  seen  as  affecting  both  process-related 
behaviors and performance outcomes (Alexander et al., 1994).  
In this study, we control for negotiator characteristics and focus on two situational characteristics. We test 
the influence of the availability of detailed cost information and the influence of the relative power structure 
of a buyer on the negotiation process and the resulting impact on the negotiation outcomes. First, we briefly 
discuss two  basic types of negotiation behavior that may  characterize the negotiation process. Then  we 
discuss how cost information and power may influence the negotiation process and resulting outcomes.   
2.2 The negotiation process  
Distributive bargaining and problem solving are the two basic negotiation strategies that purchasing agents 
appear to pursue. Each strategy has a different role in the purchase process.   
Distributive  bargaining  (aggressive  or  competitive  bargaining)  addresses  the  issue  of  how  the  available 
benefits are  to  be distributed  between  the two  parties (Walton  & McKersie's, 1966). More specifically, 
distributive bargaining is characterized by the use of zero-sum or “win-lose” tactics such as communicating 
implicit or explicit threats, making excessive demands, promises, positional commitments, and persuasive 
arguments (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Distributive tactics can be appropriate for issues that are equally valued  
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by  both  parties  (i.e.  distributive  issues).  However,  it  has  been  suggested  that  distributive  tactics  are 
counterproductive  when  they  are  inappropriately  applied  to  integrative  issues  and  that  they  set  a 
confrontational tone to the negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).   
Problem solving primarily involves discovering ways to increase the benefits available in the relationship 
(Walton & McKersie, 1966). In purchasing, bargaining is integrative to the extent that purchasing agents 
actively seek coordination with sellers to develop alternative purchasing arrangements that have the potential 
for reducing costs and/or increasing performance. The focus is on seeking an integrative solution that is 
achieved  via  open  and  accurate  informational  exchange,  mutually  concessionary  behaviors,  and  mutual 
respect for individual goals (Campbell et al., 1988). In a coordinative context, the focal negotiator will seek 
to minimize the use of any deleterious influence tactics (e.g. threats) in the negotiation because of his/her 
desire for a mutually beneficial outcome (Dant & Schul, 1992). Coordinative behavior such as open and 
accurate exchange of information and option flexibility have been linked to integrative agreements when 
tradeoffs based on issue priorities are evident (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).   
2.3 Total cost of ownership and the concept of value chain analysis 
Value chain analysis (VCA) is described as a technique that can play an important role in the management of 
supply chain relationships. This analysis was developed by Porter (1985), and in the accounting literature 
further developed by Shank (1989) and Shank and Govindarajan (1992 & 1993). VCA is used to analyze, 
coordinate and optimize linkages between activities in the value chain, by focusing on the interdependence 
between these activities. It facilitates the optimization and coordination of interdependent activities in the 
value  chain,  which  may  cross  organizational  boundaries  (Dekker,  2003).  Accounting  information  is  an 
important constituent of VCA.   
Porter's critique of what now are termed ‘traditional’ accounting systems refers to the inability of those 
systems  to  adequately  support  a  VCA.  Traditional  management  accounting  practices  are  based  on  the 
internally oriented concept of value added, which hinders firms in taking advantage of the opportunities to 
coordinate interdependence in the value chain. The value added perspective focuses on (maximizing) the 
difference between the firm's purchasing costs and selling price. Thereby it ignores linkages in the wider  
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value chain, such as the causes of this purchasing price, the costs of activities related to the product, and the 
consequences of the product for the buyer's activities (Dekker, 2003).   
Total cost of ownership (TCO) accounting systems account for costs that are caused by buying at a certain 
supplier, such as costs of ordering, delivery, quality and administration (Carr and Ittner, 1992). The TCO 
concept attempts thus to quantify all of the costs related to the purchase of a given quantity of products or 
services from a given supplier (Ellram, 1995a). The TCO approach received considerable attention during 
the last decade (for a review see Wouters, Anderson & Wynstra, 2005).   
A clear understanding of the TCO is beneficial in many purchasing situations. The information derived from 
a TCO analysis provides decision makers with an objective and easily understood argument for supporting 
and motivating a variety of purchasing decisions. It can be used to compare and evaluate different suppliers 
or supply contracts. The data allow to quantify and communicate areas of non-performance and to guide 
supplier performance improvement efforts. It can also be used in negotiations with suppliers to identify areas 
requiring  contractual  performance  improvement.  Suppliers  can  be  made  aware  of  the  extra  costs  they 
generate and of ways to improve their competitive position by reducing these costs at the buyer side (Ellram, 
1995a & 1995b; Monczka, Trent, & Handfield, 2002; Roodhooft et al., 2003 & 2005). The cost (and cost 
driver) information resulting from the analysis can be used, as suggested by Porter (1985), to optimize and 
better  coordinate  the  performance  of  activities  across  the  supply  chain.  The  possession  of  relevant 
information for the interactions places the buyer in a strong position to work with the seller in identifying 
and assessing alternative courses of action and, thus, increases the likelihood that problem-solving efforts 
will be effective. Therefore we expect that:   
H1a:   Buyers with TCO information will obtain a higher individual profit than buyers with more traditional 
cost information. 
H1b:   TCO information has a positive effect on a buyer’s use of problem solving techniques.   
8
 
2.4 The relative power structure 
Of all variables that have been identified as factors in negotiations, power is among the most important (De 
Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). Especially power resulting from the availability of alternative negotiation partners 
is a core element in many negotiations (Giebels, De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 2000 & 2003). For instance, 
sellers who know of other buyers interested in their goods or services are able to exit the negotiation and 
continue  the  negotiations  with  someone  else.  Having  an  alternative  negotiator  at  hand  reduces  their 
dependence on the other side and accordingly weakens the other party’s power position (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959; Emerson, 1962). Empirical research indeed shows that negotiators with an attractive alternative feel 
less dependent and achieve higher personal outcomes than negotiators with a less attractive or no alternative 
option (Pinkley, Neale & Bennett, 1994). People with less power tend to have lower aspirations, demand 
less, make more concessions, and receive smaller outcomes than those with more power (for a review see 
Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).   
H2a:   In an equal power setting buyers will obtain a higher individual profit than in an unequal power 
setting in which the buyer is dependent on the seller.  
A buyer’s relative power will affect his use of aggressive bargaining. As supplier competition increases, 
buyers can be expected to capitalize on the natural rivalry among suppliers to keep prices down and to 
promote product and service improvements. The buyer's use of aggressive bargaining tactics, many of which 
involve implicit or explicit threats (e.g. suggesting that the seller is in danger of losing the contract), should 
also be more credible when several suppliers are interested in the purchase contract. Compared to power 
balance, power differences lead to greater use of threats and punishments, making conflict escalation more 
likely (De Dreu, 1995; De Dreu, Giebels & Van De Vliert, 1998). The increased effectiveness of aggressive 
bargaining associated with high supplier competition should reduce the buyer's need to solve problems with 
any given supplier or group of suppliers, and the marginal benefits of doing so under these conditions often 
may not be worth the cost (Perdue & Summers, 1991). Consequently, we expect that:   
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H2b:   Buyers in an equal power setting will use less problem solving techniques and more distributive 
bargaining techniques than buyers in an unequal power setting in which the buyer is dependent on 
the seller.  
2.5 Interaction effect of power and cost information 
As we expect that TCO information has a positive effect on buyer’s use of integrative bargaining, while 
supplier competition (outside options) has a negative effect on buyer’s use of integrative bargaining and a 
positive effect on buyer’s use of distributive bargaining techniques, we can reasonably expect interaction 
effects of power and information on the bargaining process and outcomes. All the more, as information can 
be  regarded  as  a  form  of  power.  After  all  relative  power  manifests  itself  not  only  through  the  market 
structure,  but  also  through  (private)  information  (Chatterjee  &  Ulvilla,  1982),  whether  that  information 
concerns a party’s own or that party’s opponent’s preferences, payoffs or alternatives.  
Recent research indicates that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation 
(Fiske, 1993; De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). Power not only influences strategic decisions involving demands 
and the use of threats during negotiation. It also drives the processing of information about other people 
(Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Depret, 1996). When people depend on others, they may try to (re)gain control over 
their own outcomes by paying close attention to those persons so as to accurately predict their intentions and 
behaviors.   
Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) suggest that the interdependence can induce a person to be motivated to 
accurately predict other’s needs, desires, and possible actions, akin to low power individuals.  Several studies 
support this view. Erber and Fiske (1984) found that outcome dependency produced heightened attention to 
information that was inconsistent with someone’s expectations about another person. Copeland (1994) has 
argued that individuals with a power disadvantage have higher impression motivation than individuals with a 
power advantage. The idea is that lower power individuals may seek situational control by managing positive 
impressions of themselves (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske & Yzerbyt, 2000). De Dreu & Van Kleef (2004) showed 
that negotiators with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than 
incongruent questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Their research suggests  
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that this result is caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators 
and  that  belief-congruent  rather  than  incongruent  questions  produce  more  positive  impressions  during 
negotiations.   
Therefore, we expect that buyers with TCO information and less power than their opponent may try to 
(re)gain control over their own outcomes by  sharing information and by  paying close attention to their 
opponent so as to accurately predict their intentions and behaviors. This way they create a more integrative 
bargaining situation than buyers with TCO information and an outside option, which are more prone to use 
an aggressive bargaining strategy. Buyers without TCO information will not be able to create this integrative 
bargaining situation as they lack the necessary information. Therefore, we expect that:   
H3:   The  performance  disadvantage  of  less  powerful  buyers  is  less  pronounced  when  the  buyer  has 
detailed  TCO  information  because  they  will  use  more  integrative  bargaining  strategies  and  less 
distributive bargaining strategies than more powerful buyers (with TCO information).   
3. Research method 
3.1 Experimental design 
The experiment uses a 2 (power: equal versus low) x 2 (detailed TCO information versus more traditional 
cost information) design. The first factor is the relative power between buyers and sellers. Relative power 
was manipulated through the availability of an outside option. In the case of two-sided exit options the 
written  instructions  of  the  buyer  and  the  seller  contained  a  short  paragraph  about  the  presence  of  an 
alternative negotiation partner. Buyers and sellers were equally powerful as they had an outside option that 
would generate a similar profit (namely an outside option of 1000 euro). This outside option is relatively 
unattractive as higher gains can be obtained in the game by reaching an agreement. In the condition without 
outside option for the buyer, buyers were given the standard negotiation task without exit options. These 
buyers had thus no outside option and were fully dependent on reaching an agreement with their partner to 
earn any money. If no agreement was reached they would earn nothing, while their partner earned an outside 
option of 1000 euro.    
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The second factor is the buyer’s cost information. Buyers with TCO information had a payoff table with 
detailed cost information (TCO information). Buyers without TCO information only had an indication of the 
costs and the relative importance of each of the issues to be negotiated (cf. appendix A). They were informed 
on the fact that price was the most expensive issue, followed by maintenance and then by spare parts. Sellers 
were the same in each of the experimental cells: they had always an outside option of 1000 euro and full cost 
and income information.   
3.2 Subjects and procedures 
Participants were recruited from a graduate management accounting course of a Masters program in business 
administration at a large West-European university. The course had covered traditional accounting methods, 
activity-based  costing,  TCO  and  supplier  selection  problems  before  the  experiment  took  place.  The 
experiment was run in a computer laboratory. Participation required appearing at a given place and time, and 
was  restricted  to  one  session  of  maximum  1  hour.  The  opportunity  to  earn  cash,  depending  on  their 
performance, was the only offered incentive. Participants earned 0.5% of their company’s profit (on average 
5.74 euro; min = 0 euro; max = 15 euro). In total there were 208 subjects. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Procedures were identical for all treatments. Participants 
were either buyer or supplier.   
Buyers  and  suppliers  sat  in  different  rooms  so  that  participants  were  unable  to  identify  their  partner’s 
identity; hence personality effects and collusion were precluded. Participants read the instructions, describing 
their role position and the nature of the bargaining task, and played the game on their own pace. The seller 
started  the  game  by  making  a  first  offer.  Participants  could  send  messages  along  with  their  offers  and 
counteroffers if they so desired. The game ended when (i) an agreement was reached, (ii) a player opted for 
the outside option or (iii) after 10 rounds. In the last case, participants were informed by the computer 
program that time was running out. This happened only in a few cases (4 out of 104).   
3.3 The bargaining task 
The bargaining task is based on a negotiation game developed by Kelley (1966) and applied by many other 
researchers (e.g. Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Neu, Graham & Gilly, 1988; Campbell et al,  
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1988; De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). The game was adapted to suit a TCO setting. This means that the payoff 
tables of Kelley’s game were replaced by cost tables for the buyers and cost and income tables for the seller. 
The tables were constructed such that the minimum and maximum profits buyers and sellers could earn were 
the same (cf. appendix A).  
Buyers and sellers had to negotiate a lease contract for a set of machines. The buyer could earn a fixed 
income  (of  6000  euro)  by  selling  end  products  to  an  end  customer.  The  instructions  explained  that 
maintenance and spare parts were needed to run the machines and to produce an end product. Consequently, 
the game involved the simultaneous negotiation of price, maintenance, and spare parts. For each of these 
issues nine different contracts were possible.   
Price is an income for the seller, but a cost for the buyer. The price issue was thus distributive in nature. This 
issue was worth the same for each negotiator, with preferences on the issue going in opposite directions. 
Consequently,  one  party’s  gain  was  equal  to  the  other  party’s  loss.  The  task  provided,  however,  an 
opportunity for the parties to integrate their interests. The buyer had a comparative advantage in taking care 
of the spare parts and the seller had a comparative advantage in maintaining the machines. Since the issue 
that was most valuable to one party automatically was less valuable to the other party, it was possible for 
participants to trade off issues. Such “logrolling”, giving up on less valuable issues to maximize outcomes on 
the most valuable ones, would yield optimal joint outcomes. Optimal joint outcomes were reached when 
buyer and seller agreed on contract 5AZ. In this contract, the distributive issue (i.e. price) is set at the middle 
and the two integrative issues (maintenance and spare parts) are fully traded off. This situation is denoted 
with an asterisk (*) in appendix A. As cost tables were private, participants had to find out the possibility of 
a win-win solution through the process of offers and counteroffers and by exchanging information about 
their interests.   
3.4 Dependent variables 
3.4 1 Negotiation outcomes 
This study focuses on one key negotiation outcome, namely the individual profit of the buyer. The individual 
profit is the amount of money earned by a buyer at the conclusion of negotiations and is measured as the  
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player’s individual profit level associated with final agreement in (the adapted) Kelley’s (1966) negotiation 
simulation.  Although  not  the  core  of  the  analysis,  the  study  also  briefly  discusses  the  results  for  the 
individual profit of the seller and the joint profit for the dyad.   
3.4.2 Negotiation behavior 
Negotiation behavior is derived from two sets of measures: a first set is based on interaction analysis and a 
second  set is based  on  participants’  responses to  the post-game  questionnaire administered  immediately 
following the negotiation exercise.   
First,  interaction  analysis  (Putman  &  Fairhurst,  2001)  was  used  for  coding  verbal  behavior  to  examine 
categories  and  meanings  embedded  in  structural  pattern  of  talk.  The  classification  scheme  is  based  on 
negotiation communication coding schemes used in prior studies (e.g. Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Neu et al., 
1988; Alexander et al., 1994; De Dreu et al., 1998; Giebels et al., 1998, 2000 & 2003; Boles, Croson & 
Murnighan, 2000). The classification scheme is included in appendix B. Three judges, who were blind to 
conditions or hypotheses, coded each negotiation independently. Interrater agreements, expressed in Cohen’s 
Kappa, varied between 0.75 and 0.95. After completing the coding, the coders compared their coding and 
reconciled disagreements by jointly revisiting the negotiation messages and producing a single set of codes 
for each subject. Negotiation behavior was determined from analyses of these codes.   
Messages sent by participants were coded for (a) integrative behavior, measured as information exchange, 
and  (b)  distributive  behaviors  such  as  sending  threats  and  issuing  warnings.  Three  independent  judges 
established  the  participant’s  information  exchange  about  priorities  and  numerical  values  reflecting 
integrative behavior. Based on Neu et al. (1988), information exchange was coded “0” for participants not 
revealing any information about their cost structure; “1” for participants revealing the relative importance of 
each of the three to be negotiated issues without revealing any numerical values and “2” for participants 
revealing the relative importance of each of the three to be negotiated issues and the numerical values of the 
different contracts. Distributive behavior is based on 5 behavior types: general threats, exit threats, warnings, 
commitment and punishments (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81).    
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Second, bargaining behavior was also derived from post-bargaining questionnaires. Participants rated their 
opponent’s bargaining strategies on four items. The different items were derived from prior studies (e.g. 
Campbell et al., 1988) and are listed in appendix B. They measure the overall problem solving approach of 
the buyers as assessed by the seller (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88).  
4. Results  
4.1 Experimental checks 
On  completion  of  the  task,  participants  filled  out  a  post-bargaining  questionnaire  with  five-point  scales 
checking  for  motivation,  task  understanding  and  their  usage  of  cost  reports.  All  of  the  checks  on  the 
experimental inductions (on cost information relevance and power) are statistically  significant and have 
means in the appropriate direction. More powerful buyers judged themselves as more powerful (F(1,102) = 
14.61, p < 0.01) and buyers with TCO information judged the cost information they had more relevant than 
the buyers with traditional cost information (F(1,102) = 41.62, p < 0.01). Checks on procedures, including 
the subject involvement in the task (motivation, fun), their understanding of the instructions and the payoff 
tables and whether they had enough time to complete the exercise, appropriately showed no differences 
between conditions (p > 0.10). Means indicated that they were highly involved (Mean = 4.33; st.d. = 0.69), 
that they assessed the exercise as “fun” (Mean = 4.07; st.d. = 0.70), that they understood the instructions 
(Mean = 4.41; st.d. = 0.77) and the payoff tables (Mean = 4.62; st.d. = 0.51) and that they had enough time to 
complete  the  task  (Mean  =  4.40;  st.d.  =  0.98).  We  also  checked  whether  participants  in  different 
experimental cells required an equal amount of time to read the instructions and get familiar with the game 
before actually starting the game. No differences between the experimental conditions were found (p > 0.10). 
Participants needed on average 559 seconds (9.3 minutes) to read the instructions. Analyses revealed neither 
main nor interaction effects for participant gender on negotiation process or outcomes. Therefore gender was 
excluded from further analysis.           
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4.2 Negotiation outcomes 
Results
1,2 are reported in Table 1. H1a predicted that buyers with TCO information would obtain a higher 
individual  profit  than  buyers  with  more  traditional  cost  information.  As  expected,  buyers  with  TCO 
information obtained significantly higher individual profits (F(1, 100) =   52.90, p < 0.01). As expected in 
H2a, buyers in an equal power setting obtained higher individual profits (F(1, 100) =  14.02, p < 0.01), than 
buyers who were dependent on the seller. The results also yielded a power*cost information interaction (F(1, 
100) = 4.58, p < 0.05). The performance deficit for less powerful buyers actually disappeared when they had 
TCO information: the individual profits of buyers with TCO information, and with or without an outside 
option, do not differ significantly (Mean =1148.33 versus Mean =1007.69; F(1,54) = 2.46, p > 0.10). The 
performance deficit of less powerful buyers is thus less pronounced when the buyers have detailed TCO 
information, providing support for hypothesis H3.   
<Insert Table 1 here>  
Table 1 also reports the results of the analyses on the individual profit of the seller and on joint profit. An 
ANOVA on the individual profit of the seller revealed main effects for power and cost information. Sellers 
facing less powerful buyers earn higher individual profits (F(1, 100) =  17.46, p < 0.01). However, sellers’ 
individual profit is lower when they play against buyers with TCO information (F(1, 100) =   15.80, p < 
0.01). Joint profits are significantly higher when the buyer possesses TCO information (F(1, 100) =  15.78, p 
< 0.01).   
These results imply that the high individual profits for buyers with TCO information but without an outside 
option are not to be explained by the fact that they know “how to fool” the (more powerful) sellers, but by 
the fact that these dyads realize higher joint profits than dyads in which the buyer has an outside option 
(mean joint profit = 2446.15 versus mean joint profit = 2336.67). Sellers facing a buyer without an outside 
option earn more than their less powerful opponent (mean individual profit buyer = 1007.69 versus mean 
individual power seller = 1438.46), reflecting the power imbalance. These less powerful buyers with TCO 
                                                
 
1 A correlation matrix of all variables included in the study is provided in appendix C. 
2 Analyses were performed for all subjects in the study. However, analyses of the data without including the subjects 
not reaching agreement yielded the same results.   
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information are, however, somehow able to earn similar individual profits as buyers with an outside option. 
In order to explain these negotiation results, we analyze the negotiation behavior of the participants.    
4.3 Negotiation behavior  
In order to test H1b and H2b, analyses were performed on the negotiation behavior variables.  An ANOVA 
on information exchange
3 revealed main effects for cost information (F(1,100) = 6.14, p < 0.05) and power 
(F(1,100) = 4.16, p < 0.05): buyers with TCO information disclosed more information than buyers with 
traditional information and more powerful buyers disclosed less information than less powerful buyers.   
An ANOVA on distributive behavior resulted in main effects for cost information (F(1,100)   = 5.77, p < 
0.05) and power (F(1,100)  = 14.20, p < 0.01), and in a significant interaction effect (F(1,100) = 4.89, p < 
0.05). The interaction effect is additive, meaning that buyers with TCO information and with an outside 
option significantly use more distributive bargaining techniques than buyers in the three other experimental 
conditions.   
Negotiation behavior of the buyer was also assessed by the composite measure of problem solving approach. 
Main effects were found for cost information (F(1,100) = 242.00, p < 0.01) and power (F(1,100) = 15.85, p < 
0.01),  as  well  as  an  interaction  effect  (F(1,100)  =  3.44,  p  <  0.10).  Thus,  according  to  the  sellers,  less 
powerful buyers use more problem solving techniques than buyers with an outside option and buyers with 
TCO  information  make  more  extensive  use  of  problem  solving  techniques  than  buyers  with  traditional 
information. Overall these results provide strong support for hypotheses H1b and H2b. 
                                                
 
3 Problem solving behavior was also derived from the messages sent by participants. Integrative behavior is based on 
two  measures:  the  number  of  rewards  and  the  number  of  positive  normative  appeals  (Cronbach’s  alpha  =  0.70). 
Cooperative behavior was also assessed by counting the explicit requests for cooperation. However, this latter measure 
did not load with the rewards and the appeals on one factor and was therefore excluded from the cooperative behavior 
measure. An analysis on the composite measure of integrative behavior revealed a main effect for power (F(1,100) = 
4.13, p < 0.05) and an interaction effect of cost information and power on integrative behavior (F(1,100) = 5.02, p < 
0.05). Less powerful buyers use more integrative bargaining techniques (F(1,102) =  4.71, p < 0.05) than buyers with an 
outside option. However, within the group of less powerful buyers, buyers with TCO information made more extensive 
use of integrative bargaining techniques (F(1,46) = 3.40, p < 0.10). An ANOVA on the explicit requests for cooperation 
revealed main effects for cost information (F(1,100) = 10.45, p < 0.01) and power (F(1,100) = 6.39, p < 0.05), as well as 
an interaction effect (F(1,100) = 5.73, p < 0.05). Pairwise comparisons with Tukey tests indicated that buyers with TCO 
information  and  no  outside  option  request  more  frequently  for  active  cooperation  than  buyers  in  the  three  other 
conditions (p < 0.01).   
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4.4 Test of mediation and moderation  
Based on exchange theory, we hypothesized a mediation effect of the negotiation process on the negotiation 
outcome (H3). More specifically, we expected that the interaction effect of power and cost information could 
be  explained  by  the  negotiation  behavior.  We  hypothesized  that  negotiation  behavior  mediates  the 
moderating  effect  of  cost  information  on  individual  profit.  To  test  this  relationship,  we  use  Baron  and 
Kenny’s (1986) framework for combining mediation and moderation. We selected the two most widely used 
negotiation behaviors to test these relationships, namely integrative (measured as information exchange) and 
distributive behavior (e.g. Giebels et al., 2000).   
First, we consider the effect of information exchange. The analysis proceeds in three steps as shown in Table 
2. The first step is a regression of power, cost information and their interaction on the outcome variable 
(individual profit). The two main effects were significant and the significant interaction effect indicated 
moderation. In the second step, two equations were estimated. First information exchange is regressed on 
power, cost information, and their interaction effect power*cost information. Second, individual profit is 
regressed on power, cost information, their interaction and information exchange. Eventually, in step three, 
one equation is estimated: individual profit is regressed on power, cost information, power*cost information, 
information exchange and the interaction term cost information*information exchange. This last equation is 
identical to the second Step 2 equation, but the cost information*information exchange term has been added. 
The key question is the extent to which the power*cost information effect on individual profit is reduced in 
moving from Step 2 to Step 3. Information exchange mediates the moderating effects of cost information on 
power if the following conditions are met (Baron & Kenny, 1986): (1) power*cost information must have 
less  of  an  effect  on  individual  profit  at  Step  3  than  at  Step  2,  and  the  interaction  term  cost 
information*information exchange must affect individual profit and (2) in Step 2 cost information should 
affect  information  exchange,  which  results  in  power*cost  information  and  cost  information*information 
exchange being correlated. As can been seen in Table 2, all these conditions are met: the interaction effect on 
individual  profit  is  reduced  in  Step  3  and  has  dropped  to  a  non-significant  level.  This  implies  that 
information exchange and not cost information moderates the power to individual profit relation. Hence, 
information exchange mediates the moderating effects of cost information on power.     
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< Insert Table 2 here>  
The same three-step-procedure is undertaken for problem solving approach (cf. Table 3). The results are very 
similar to the results obtained in Table 2. Lastly, the three-step procedure is also undertaken for distributive 
bargaining behavior (cf. Table 4). Again we see that the power*cost information effect on individual profit is 
reduced in moving from Step 2 to Step 3 (though it does not drop to non significance). This implies that 
distributive behavior only partially moderates the cost information to individual profit relation.   
< Insert Table 3 here> 
< Insert Table 4 here>  
As a last set of analyses, we test for the overall mediation effects of the negotiation process (cf. Table 5)
4,5. A 
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which dummy variables representing the manipulations 
were entered at Step 1 and the proposed sets of mediators were entered at Step 2 (cf. Weingart, Hyder & 
Prietula, 1996). Results for regression (1) are very similar to the results we obtained with the ANOVA 
analysis: both main effects and the interaction effect are significant. The R² of the model is 0.41 and is highly 
significant  (p  <  0.01).  When  the  process  variables  are  added  to  the  equation,  the  interaction  effect  of 
power*cost  information  drops  to  a  non-significant  level  (coefficient  =  -233.69,  p  >  0.10).  All  process 
variables reach significance. Information exchange has a negative impact on individual profit (coefficient = -
467.70, p < 0.01). However, the positive and significant interaction effect of cost information*information 
exchange (coefficient = 700.11, p < 0.01) implies that this negative relation between information exchange 
and individual profit is only true for buyers lacking TCO information. Buyers with TCO information and 
                                                
 
4 The process variables in Table 5 are information exchange and distributive behavior (and their interaction with 
respectively cost information and power). Replacing the information exchange variable by the problem solving behavior 
variable yielded the same results.   
5 Finally, also some sensitivity analyses were performed to test the robustness of the results against different ways of 
measuring negotiation behavior. First, similar results are obtained when information exchange was coded 0 for participants not 
revealing any information about their cost structure; 1 for participants revealing the relative importance of each of the three to be 
negotiated issues (with or without the numerical values). Second, participants also rated their own bargaining strategies. The 
problem solving behavior of the buyer assessed by the buyer is highly correlated with the problem solving behavior of 
the buyer assessed by the seller (Pearson correlation = 0.41, p < 0.01). However, as one of the four items (the item 
asking whether they were honest or deceptive) assessed by the buyer, did not load with the other items on one factor, 
the problem solving construct is based on the seller’s assessment of the buyer’s behavior. Similar results are obtained 
and conclusions remain the same in case the problem solving approach construct combines the items from both the 
sellers’ and the buyers’ questionnaires.     
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exchanging information have a significant higher individual profit. Distributive behavior has a positive effect 
on individual profit (coefficient = 1188.89, p < 0.05), but not for the buyers with power (coefficient = 
1181.94, p < 0.05). In addition, the R² of the model increased significantly from 0.41 to 0.52 (F for change in 
R² = 5.76, p < 0.01). These results provide support for hypothesis H3, as well as for the exchange model of 
negotiations.  
< Insert Table 5 here>  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This  paper  examined  the  moderating  effect  of  cost  information  (TCO  information  versus  traditional 
information) on a buyer’s individual profit when buyer power was high or low. The interaction effect of cost 
information and power on buyers’ individual profit is supported. Our results indicate that the availability of 
detailed TCO information can alleviate the disadvantage dependent buyers face vis-à-vis a more powerful 
seller.  This  result  has  profound  managerial  implications.  On  the  one  hand,  this  result  implies  that  less 
powerful buyers can compensate their power disadvantage by gathering more detailed cost information. On 
the other hand, powerful buyers do not seem to be able to use this more detailed cost information to enhance 
their power advantage so as to obtain an even higher individual profit.   
We obtained insights into this result by examining the negotiation process. Consistent with exchange theory 
we expected that buyers with detailed cost information and less power than their opponent try to (re)gain 
control over their own outcomes by sharing information and by paying close attention to their partners so as 
to accurately predict their intentions and behaviors. Detailed analyses of the bargaining behavior indeed 
support this hypothesis. We find that more powerful buyers choose a more distributive and less integrative 
strategy. These results confirm findings from prior research (Perdue & Summer, 1991; De Dreu et al., 1998). 
We find also an unexpected positive main effect of cost information on distributive behavior. However, as 
indicated by the interaction effect of cost information and power on distributive behavior, this main effect 
can be explained by the fact that specifically the buyers with TCO information and power are prone to use 
distributive techniques.    
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From these results we can conclude that the manipulation of power and cost information resulted in buyers 
using different negotiation techniques or strategies. The less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data 
will  use  problem  solving  behavior,  whereas  powerful  buyers  rely  on  aggressive  bargaining  techniques. 
Particularly interesting is, however, that the problem solving strategy of less powerful buyers with TCO 
information  seems  to  be  effective,  whereas  the  aggressive  bargaining  strategy  of  more  powerful  buyers 
appears to fail. Indeed, we find that the individual profit of these two groups did not significantly differ. 
These results may be explained by the fact that less powerful buyers are able to create a cooperative and 
coordinated relationship, in which the seller is willing to consider the objectives of the buyer. When the 
source  gives  information  about  needs  and  preferences  and/or  makes  concessions  generating  movement 
towards a prominent solution, the target is likely to reciprocate (Campbell et al., 1988; Gouldner, 1960). This 
may explain the higher individual profits for less powerful buyers with TCO information. Less powerful 
buyers lacking TCO information are not able to communicate the right information and are therefore unable 
to create this integrative situation. More powerful buyers, on the other hand, have a false feeling of power 
and choose an aggressive bargaining strategy that, in a tit-for-tat fashion, is responded to by an aggressive 
bargaining  strategy  of  the  seller.  The  aggressive  bargaining  strategy  of  the  powerful  buyer  may  not be 
effective when he is facing a powerful seller.    
First support for these conjectures was found in our follow-up analyses, in which we tested whether the 
moderation effect of cost information on the power to individual profit relation (i.e. interaction effect of 
power and TCO information) can be explained by the choice of a negotiation strategy. We found indeed that 
the interaction effect of power and cost information is mediated by the bargaining behavior of the buyer. 
Furthermore,  a  limited  analysis  of  the  bargaining  behavior  of  the  seller  (not  reported)  disclosed  the 
reciprocate nature of his bargaining behavior. An ANOVA on information exchange of the seller revealed a 
main effect for cost information: sellers facing buyers with TCO information disclosed more information 
than sellers facing buyers with traditional information. Furthermore, we also found that sellers facing a 
powerful buyer with TCO information issued more threats and referred more often to their outside option 
than sellers in the other experimental conditions. Recall that the experimental manipulation for the sellers 
was the same in each of the experimental conditions: sellers had always an outside option and full cost 
information. The differences in bargaining behavior of the sellers across the different experimental cells need  
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thus to be explained as a result of their interaction with the buyers. These findings provide support for our 
conjecture that less powerful buyers are able to create a cooperative relationship, in which the seller is 
willing to follow. This resulted not only in higher individual profits, but also in higher joint profits for the 
dyad.   
Our results suggest thus that powerful buyers with refined TCO information may not realize all possible 
benefits from buyer-supplier interactions due to their bargaining strategy. Their (false) feeling of power 
causes an increase of distributive bargaining tactics and a reluctance to share the necessary information for 
inter-firm  cost  minimization.  This  implies  that  powerful  buyers  may  only  benefit  from  more  refined 
accounting information systems if these firms undertake efforts to encourage information sharing and to 
discourage aggressive bargaining strategies of their employees.   
Finally, we present some limitations and further research possibilities. First, while the experimental context 
induced by a simple negotiation game (Kelley, 1966) allows maintaining control over exogenous variables, 
the scope for generalizing the conclusions is somewhat limited. Other factors, such as the incentive system, 
past  negotiation  history,  future  negotiations  probabilities,  etc.  have  been  shown  to  impact  negotiated 
outcomes but were not manipulated here. Further research is necessary to determine the sensitivity of the 
results to several experimental parameters included in the current study.  
Second,  this  study  did  not  manipulate  the  negotiation  context  for  the  seller:  the  sellers  faced  the  same 
experimental conditions in all four cells. They were always fully informed and powerful. As a consequence, 
our  conclusions  do  not  generalize  beyond  negotiation  settings  in  which  the  seller  is  always  at  least  as 
powerful as the buyer. Further research can alter the experimental conditions and examine the role of TCO 
information from both buyer and seller perspectives.  
Third, our manipulation of TCO information obviously remained a simplification of reality. In our study, we 
provided perfect TCO information. In a real business environment, TCO information is not perfect, but 
characterized by mistakes and simplifications. Further research can examine the effects of imperfect TCO 




Fourth, although optimal joint outcomes are introduced, the paper focuses mainly on the outcome of one 
party. This focus underplays the cost/benefit trade off of obtaining the additional information needed for 
TCO. It is interesting to consider whether buyers would be willing to incur a cost in order to obtain TCO 
information if it had been efficient to do so.   
Further research is thus needed to unravel the usefulness of accounting information in inter-firm negotiations 
and to demonstrate how accounting information affects behavior and outcomes.      
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Appendix A. Experimental cells and corresponding cost tables  
Power 
 
No outside option  Outside option 
Cost information   
TCO information  Cell 1 (n= 30)  Cell 2 (n= 26) 
Traditional cost information  Cell 3 (n= 26)  Cell 4 (n= 22) 
 




Price (=income)  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract 1  600  Contract A *  1350  Contract R  2250 
Contract 2  1200  Contract B  1200  Contract S  2000 
Contract 3  1800  Contract C  1050  Contract T  1750 
Contract 4  2400  Contract D  900  Contract U  1500 
Contract 5 *  3000  Contract E  750  Contract V  1250 
Contract 6  3600  Contract F  600  Contract W  1000 
Contract 7  4200  Contract G  450  Contract X  750 
Contract 8  4800  Contract H  300  Contract Y  500 
Contract 9  5400  Contract I   150  Contract Z *  250 
 
Cost table for the buyer with TCO information (in cell 1 and 2):
 
 
Income  = 6000 
 
 
Price (=cost)  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract 1  600  Contract A *  250  Contract R  150 
Contract 2  1200  Contract B  500  Contract S  300 
Contract 3  1800  Contract C  750  Contract T  450 
Contract 4  2400  Contract D  1000  Contract U  600 
Contract 5 *  3000  Contract E  1250  Contract V  750 
Contract 6  3600  Contract F  1500  Contract W  900 
Contract 7  4200  Contract G  1750  Contract X  1050 
Contract 8  4800  Contract H  2000  Contract Y  1200 
Contract 9  5400  Contract I  2250  Contract Z *  1350 
 
Cost table for the buyer with traditional cost information (in cell 3 and 4):
 
 
Income  = 6000 
 
 
Price (=cost)  Number of maintenance sessions 
performed by the buyer each month 
Spare parts procured by the buyer 
from a third party each month 
Contract 1  600  Contract A *  1  Contract R  3  
Contract 2  1200  Contract B  2  Contract S  6 
Contract 3  1800  Contract C  3  Contract T  9 
Contract 4  2400  Contract D  4  Contract U  12 
Contract 5 *  3000  Contract E  5  Contract V  15 
Contract 6  3600  Contract F  6  Contract W  18 
Contract 7  4200  Contract G  7  Contract X  21 
Contract 8  4800  Contract H  8  Contract Y  24 
Contract 9  5400  Contract I  9  Contract Z *  27 
                                                
 
6 The tables were constructed such that the minimum (-3000 Euro) and maximum profits (5000 Euro) buyers 
and sellers could earn were the same. Optimal joint outcomes were reached when buyer and seller agreed on 
contract 5AZ. This situation is denoted with an asterisk (*).   
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Appendix B. Measuring negotiation behavior  
B1. Behavioral coding categories  
Category  Examples 
Information exchange  -  Maintenance is more expensive for my company than spare parts. 
-  The contracts for maintenance starts at €250 (=contract A) and increases 
with €250 until €2250 (= contract I); the contracts for spare parts starts at 
€150 (=contract R) and increases with €150 until €1350 (= contract Z). 
General threats   -  Make a concession or you will be in trouble.  
Exit threats  -  Respond with a concession or I will call another supplier.  
Punishment   -  This negotiation is going nowhere.  
Warnings    -  My company has a policy against uncooperative supplier.  
Positional commitment   -  I refuse to concede any further. 




B2. Buyers’ problem solving approach  
Observed ratings from sellers’ questionnaires 
Do you feel that the person with whom you were paired was more interested in solving your mutual problem, 
or more self-interested? 
                    1               2               3               4              5 
Self-interested                                                            Solving a mutual problem  
Rate your partner’s bargaining strategies on the following scales: 
                    1               2               3               4              5 
Exploitative                                                                Accommodating 
                    1               2               3               4              5 
Honest                                                                        Deceptive 
                    1               2               3               4              5 











1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1  individual profit buyer 
a  
1        
2  individual profit seller 
b   -0.71 
(**)  1       
3  joint profit
 c   0.54 
(**) 
0.21 
(*)  1      
4  information exchange 
d    0.14   0.19   0.41 
(**)  1     
5  distributive behavior 




0.07   0.09   1    









0.09   1   
7  cost information 











(**)  1  
8  power 










0.00   1  
a  Buyer’s individual profit at the end of game (based on the cost table provided in Appendix A). 
b  Seller’s individual profit at the end of game (based on the cost table provided in Appendix A). 
c  Joint profit is the sum of buyer’s individual profit and seller’s individual profit at the end of game. 
d   Information exchange was coded “0” for buyers not revealing any information about their cost structure; 
“1” for buyers revealing the relative importance of each of the three to be negotiated issues without 
revealing any numerical values and “2” for buyers revealing the relative importance of each of the three 
to be negotiated issues. 
e   Coded from the messages sent by buyers (based on the behavioral coding scheme in Appendix B1). Based 
on five distributive behavior types (general threats, exit threats, positional commitment, punishments, 
warnings) with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81. 
f   Buyer’s problem solving approach based on observed ratings from seller’s questionnaire (based on the 
four items included in Appendix B2) with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88. 
g  Dummy variable, experimentally manipulation: 0 for traditional cost information, 1 for TCO information. 
h  Dummy variable, experimentally manipulation: 0 for buyers with no outside option, 1 for buyers with an 
outside option.   
(*)    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  





Alexander, J.F., Schul, P.L., & McCorkle, D.E. (1994). An assessment of selected relationships in a model of 
the industrial marketing negotiation process.  The Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 14, 3, 
25-39 
Bagozzi, R.P. (1978). Marketing as exchange: a theory of transactions in the market place. The American 
Behavioral Scientist, 21, 4, 536-556 
Baron,  R.,  &  Kenny,  D.  (1986).  The  moderator-mediator  variable  distinction  in  social  psychological 
research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
51, 6, 1173-1182 
Bazerman,  M.H.,  Curhan,  J.R.,  Moore,  D.A.,  &  Valley,  K.L.  (2000).  Negotiation.  Annual  Review  of 
Psychology, 51, 1, 279-314 
Bensaou, M. (1999). Portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships. Sloan Management Review, 40, 4, 35-44 
Boles, T.L., Croson, R.T.A., & Murnighan, J.K. (2000). Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum 
bargaining.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83, 2, 235-259 
Campbell, N.C.G., Graham, J.L., Jolibert, A., & Meissner, H.G. (1998). Marketing negotiations in France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Journal of Marketing, 52, 2, 49-62 
Carr, L.P., & Ittner, C.D. (1992). Measuring the cost of ownership. Journal of Cost Management, 6, 3, 7-13 
Carr, A.S.,  & Pearson, J.N. (1999). Strategically  managed  buyer-supplier relationships and  performance 
outcomes. Journal of Operations Management, 17, 5, 497-519 
Chatterjee, K., & Ulvilla, J.W. (1982). Bargaining with Shared Information. Decision Sciences, 13, 3, 380-
404 
Copeland,  J.T.  (1994).  Prophecies  of  power:  motivational  implications  of  social  power  for  behavioral 
confirmation.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 2, 264-277 
Dant,  R.P.,  &  Schul,  P.L.  (1992).  Conflict  resolution  processes  in  contractual  channels  of  distribution. 
Journal of Marketing, 56, 1, 38-54 
De  Dreu,  C.  K.  W.  (1995).  Coercive  power  and  concession  making  in  bilateral  negotiation.  Journal  of 
Conflict Resolution, 39, 4, 646–670 
De  Dreu,  C.K.W.,  Giebels,  E.,  &  Van  De  Vliert,  E.  (1998).  Social  motives  and  trust  in  integrative 
negotiation: disruptive effects of punitive capability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 3, 407-422   
27
 
De Dreu, C.K.W., & Van Kleef, G.A. (2004). The influence of power on the information search, impression 
formation, and demands in negotiation. Journal of experimental Social Psychology, 40, 3, 303-319 
Degraeve, Z., & Roodhooft, F. (2001). A smarter Way to Buy. Harvard Business Review, 79, 6, 22-23 
Dekker, H.C. (2003). Value chain analysis in interfirm relationships: a field study. Management Accounting 
Research, 14, 1, 1-23 
Drake, A., & Haka, S. (2005). Does ABC exacerbate the hold-up problem between buyers and suppliers. 
American Accounting Association Annual Meeting Proceedings, 45p. 
Druckman,  D.  (1977).  Social-psychological  approaches  to  the  study  of  negotiation.  In  D.  Druckman, 
Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives, 15-44. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. 
Ellram, L.M. (1995a). Activity based costing and total cost of ownership: a critical linkage. Journal of Cost 
Management, 9, 1, 22-30 
Ellram, L.M. (1995b). Total cost of Ownership: an analysis approach for purchasing. International Journal 
of Physical Distribution and Logistics, 25, 8, 4-23   
Emerson, R.M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27, 1, 31-41 
Erber, R., & Fiske, S.T. (1984). Outcome dependency and attention to inconsistent information. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 4, 709-726 
Fiske, S.T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American Psychologist, 
48, 6, 621-628 
Fiske, S.T., & Depret, E. (1996). Control, interdependence, and power: understanding social cognition in its 
social  context.  In  W.  Stroebe  &  M.  Hewstone,  European  review  of  social  psychology,  vol.  7,  31-61. 
Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Gelfand, M., & Christakopoulou, S. (1999). Culture and Negotiation Cognition: Judgment Accuracy and 
Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 79, 3, 248-269 
Gergen, K. J. (1969). The psychology of behavior exchange, vol. 11, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Giebels, E., De Dreu, C.K.W., & Van de Vliert, E. (1998). The alternative negotiator as the invisible third at 
the table: the impact of potency information. International Journal of Conflict Management, 9, 1, 5-21  
28
 
Giebels, E., De Dreu, C.K.W., & Van de Vliert, E. (2000). Interdependence in negotiation: effects of exit 
options  and  social  motive  on  distributive  and  integrative  negotiation.  European  Journal  of  Social 
Psychology, 30, 2, 255-272 
Giebels, E., De Dreu, C.K.W., & Van de Vliert, E. (2003). No way out or swallow the bait of two-sided exit 
options in negotiation: the influence of social motives and interpersonal trust. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 6, 4, 369-386 
Goodwin,  S.A.,  Gubin, A.,  Fiske,  S.T.,  &  Yzerbyt,  V.Y.  (2000).  Power  can  bias  impression  processes: 
stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 3, 3, 227-
256 
Gouldner, A.W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement. American Socialogical Review, 
25, 2, 161-178 
Homans, G.C. (1974). Social behavior: its elementary forms, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.  
Janda, S, & Sesehardi, S. (2001). The influence of purchasing strategies on performance. Journal of Business 
& Industrial Marketing, 16 4, 300-308  
Kelley,  H.H.  (1966).  A  classroom study  of  the  dilemmas  in  interpersonal  negotiation.  In  K.  Archibald, 
Strategic Interaction and Conflict, Berkerley, California: Institute of International Studies.  
Lax, D., & Sebenius, J.K. (1986). The manager as negotiator: bargaining for cooperation and competitive 
gain. New York: Free Press. 
Monczka, R.M., Trent, R., & Handfield, R. (2002). Purchasing and supply chain management, 2nd ed. 
Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing. 
Neu, J., Graham, J.L., & Gilly, M.C. (1988). The influence of gender on behaviors and outcomes in a retail 
buyer-seller negotiation simulation. Journal of Retailing, 64, 4, 427-451 
Perdue, B.C., & Summer, J.O. (1991). Purchasing agents’ use of negotiation strategies. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 18, 2, 175-189 
Pinkley, R. L., Neale, M.A., & Bennett, R.J. (1994). The impact of alternatives to settlement in dyadic 
negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 57, 1, 97-116 
Porter, M.E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: creating and sustaining superior performance. New York: The 
Free Press  
29
 
Pruitt,  D.G.,  &  Carnevale,  P.J.D.  (1993).  Negotiation  in  social  conflict.  Buckingham,  England:  Open 
University Press and Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Pruitt, D.G., & Lewis, S.A. (1975). Development of integrative solutions in bilateral-negotiation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 4, 621-633 
Putman, L.L., & Fairhurst, G.T. (2001). Discourse Analysis in Organization. In F. Jablin & L. Putman, The 
New Handbook of Organizational Communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Raiffa, H., (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Roodhooft, F., Hiel, G., Van den Abbeele, A. & van Doveren, B. (2003). Optimised sourcing strategies using 
Total Cost of Ownership. Cost Management, 17, 4, 28-35 
Roodhooft, F., Van den Abbeele, A. & Peeters, F. (2005). Calculating the total cost of ownership of utilities: 
a case of inter-firm cost management. Cost Management, 19, 5, 13-23 
Schurr, P.H., & Ozanne, J.L. (1985). Influence on exchange processes: buyer’s preconceptions of a seller’s 
trustworthiness and bargaining toughness. Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 4, 939-953  
Shank, J.K. (1989). Strategic cost management: new wine, or just new bottles? Management Accounting 
Research, 1, 47–65 
Shank, J.K., & Govindarajan, V. (1992). Strategic cost management: the value chain perspective. Journal of 
Management Accounting, Research, 4, 179-197 
Shank,  J.K.,  &  Govindarajan,  V.  (1993).  Strategic  Cost  Management:  the  new  tool  for  competitive 
advantage. New York: The Free Press. 
Thibaut, J.W., & Kelley, H.H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Walton,  R.E.,  &  McKersie,  R.B.  (1966).  Behavioral  Dilemmas  in  Mixed-Motive  Decision  Making. 
Behavioral Science, 11, 5, 370-384 
Weingart,  L.R.,  Hyder,  E.B.  &  Prietula,  M.J.  (1996).  Knowledge  Matters:  The  Effect  of  Tactical 
Descriptions on Negotiation Behavior and Outcome. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 70, 6, 
1204-1217 
Wouters, M., Anderson, J.C., & Wynstra, F. (2005). The adoption of total cost of ownership for sourcing 




Analysis of the negotiation outcome and behavior of the buyer   
Panel A: Summary statistics for the negotiation outcomes and behavior of the buyer
a    
TCO information  traditional cost information 
 
 
outside option  no outside option  outside option  no outside option 

















































Panel B: ANOVA for the negotiation outcomes and behavior of the buyer
 b    
cost information  power  cost information 
* power 











joint profit   15.78 
(***) 
0.13  1.20 




















a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The cells of the table in Panel A contain, for each of the experimental 
cells, the means and the (standard deviation) for the variables individual profit, information exchange, 
integrative behavior, requests for information and distributive behavior.  
b   Panel B presents the results of five ANOVA analyses. The dependent variables are respectively individual 
profit, information exchange, integrative behavior, requests for cooperation and distributive behavior. 
Cost information and power are the between-subject factors. Reported are the F-statistics. (***), (**), (*) 




Three step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of information exchange
a   


























power  516.26 
 (***)  




power*cost information  -375.62 
 (**)  
-0.28   -361.45 
(**) 
-250.73  
information exchange    51.19   -405.96 
(***) 
cost information 














a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, 
the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the 
interaction term power*cost information. In Step 2, first the dependent variable information exchange is 
regressed  on  the  variables  cost  information,  power  and  the  interaction  term  power*cost  information. 
Then, the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the 
interaction term power*cost information and information exchange. In Step 3, the dependent variable 
individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost 
information,  information  exchange  and  the  interaction  term  cost  information*information  exchange. 




Three step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of problem solving 
approach
a   














174.60   1012.78 
(***) 







power  516.26 
 (***)  




power*cost information  -375.62 






problem solving approach    4.24   -487.50 
(***) 
cost information * problem 














a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, 
the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the 
interaction term power*cost information. In Step 2, first the dependent variable problem solving approach 
is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. 
Then, the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the 
interaction term power*cost information and problem solving approach. In Step 3, the dependent variable 
individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost 
information,  problem  solving  approach  and  the  interaction  term  cost  information*problem  solving 





Three step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of distributive behavior
a   









constant   181.82 
(*) 
0.05   179.73 
(*) 
138.99  
cost information  825.87 
(***) 




power  516.26  
(***) 












distributive behavior    46.00  942.23 
(*) 
power 














a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, 
the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the 
interaction term power*cost information. In Step 2, first the dependent variable distributive behavior is 
regressed  on  the  variables  cost  information,  power  and  the  interaction  term  power*cost  information. 
Then, the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the 
interaction  term power*cost  information  and  distributive  behavior.  In  Step  3,  the  dependent  variable 
individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost 
information,  distributive  behavior  and  the  interaction  term  power*distributive  behavior.  Regression 




Hierarchical regression results for individual profit of the buyer    
Equation 1:  
situational characteristics 
Equations 2:  
situational characteristics 
and negotiation process 












power*cost information  -375.62 
(**) 
-233.69  
information exchange   -467.67 
(***) 
cost information*information exchange   700.11 
(***) 
distributive behavior   1188.89  
(**) 
power*distributive behavior   -1181.94 
(**) 
R²  0.41  0.52 




Change in R²   0.11 
F for change in R²  5.76 
(***) 
 
a  Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of two regression analyses. First, the 
dependent  variable  individual  profit  is  regressed  on  the  variables  cost  information,  power  and  the 
interaction term power*cost information. Second, the dependent variable individual profit is regressed on 
the  variables  cost  information,  power,  the  interaction  term  power*cost  information,  information 
exchange,  the  interaction  term  cost  information*information  exchange,  distributive  behavior  and  the 
interaction  term  power*distributive  behavior.  Regression  coefficients  are  reported.  (***),  (**),  (*) 
indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. This document was created with Win2PDF available at http://www.daneprairie.com.
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